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# Labor-Market Frictions and Endogenous Production Network formation

Jacob B. Howard  
University of Colorado Boulder

April 2019

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# Labor-Market Frictions and Endogenous Production-Network Formation

University of Colorado Boulder

Jacob.B.Howard@colorado.edu

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## Abstract

This paper presents a model of endogenous production-network formation in which firms face a labor-market featuring worker-firm matching frictions. The model demonstrates the role of labor mobility across sectors in determining production-network centrality. The model also shows how endogenous production-networks determine the distribution of workers' employment searches across sectors. These two effects are inseparable due to the feedback from one effect to another. That is, endogenous production-network formation leads to labor-market shifts, which lead to further changes in the production network, driving another change in the distribution of employees across sectors in a continuing evolution. Failing to account for labor-market mobility in a model of endogenous production-network formation, may considerably misstate the rate at which variables respond to trade shocks and in the case of some variables can even change the sign of the response.

# 1 Introduction

Firms combine inputs and workers to produce output. The firm must maintain a costly relationship with its suppliers to ensure that it is able to access the inputs it needs to reach its production goals. At the same time, the firm must also source workers from a labor-market that is not competitive. Labor-market frictions affect the way that firms form their production network. In a 2009 survey of managers conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 20% of managers reported that a labor dispute had affected their supply chain over the previous year. The efficiency of the supply chain also determines the distribution of workers searching for employment across sectors. Workers choose to search for employment in a given sector based off the expected wage in that sector. If the sector features a highly integrated supply chain then the probability of finding employment in the sector, the number of workers that look for employment in the sector, and total employment in that sector will be higher. Little is known about the interaction between labor-market frictions and production-network frictions and how they respond to economic shocks. This interaction is

This implies that the size of the sectoral wage changes due to shocks will also be determined by the ability of firms in the sector to find trading partners with whom to build their production network.

This paper studies the following questions: What is the effect of labor-market frictions on the endogenous formation of production networks? To what extent does endogenous production-network formation affect total employment? How do workers migrate across sectors in response to shocks and to what extent does this migration drive changes in production-network formation? Finally, how do endogenous changes in the production network drive changes in expected wages, and thus the endogenous labor supply across sectors? In short, I investigate how endogenous production networks affect the endogenous labor supply available across sectors, and vice versa, in a feedback mechanism.

Prior work on endogenous production-network formation has mostly focused on the role of firm-level productivities and network centrality in determining the density of the production network (Lim [1] and Bernard and Moxnes [3]). Here I present a new mechanism for driving density differences across production networks, labor-market friction differences across sectors. This paper builds a model that points out that sectors with lower levels of labor-market frictions will be more central in the production-network. This reflects the fact that firms in sectors with lower levels of labor-market frictions are more profitable for other firms to trade with since they produce more output (making them more attractive as a potential customer) and operate at lower unit costs (making them more attractive as a potential supplier).

Prior work on the responsiveness of production networks to shocks such as Huneus [2], Baqaee and Farhi [4], Bernard, Moxnes, and Saito [5], Gabaix [6], also have ignored the local migration of employees across sectors, focusing only on how shocks propagate throughout the economy based on firm-level productivities. While this effect is still present in my model, the addition of labor-market frictions induces two new effects. First, some workers migrate out of the sector that is relatively harmed by the shock. This harms the ability of firms in that sector to form production-network linkages. The workers that left the relatively harmed sector will now search for employment in the sector that is relatively less affected by the shock. This first effect suggests

that the models above overstate the rate at which production networks respond to trade shocks, and thus the rate at which shocks propagate throughout the economy. The second effect has to do with the feedback mechanism. As workers move into the sector that relatively benefits from the shock, firms in this sector will now find it profitable to supply to more firms (this includes firms in the relatively harmed sector). This increases the likelihood that firms in the relatively harmed sector find it profitable to supply to other firms, counteracting the first effect. The net effect of labor-market frictions on the rate at which production networks respond to trade shocks depends on the size of these two effects.

Finally my analysis contributes to the literature on structural labor models that focus on how trade shocks, offshoring, and outsourcing affect labor-market outcomes (Helpman and Itskhoki [7], Helpman et al. [8], Egger and Kreickemeier [9], Autor, Dorn, and Hanson [10], Acemoglu et al. [11], Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro [12], and Grossman and Helpman [13]) I derive a model to look at how employees are affected by shocks through changes in firm abilities to source inputs through endogenous production-networks. Previous papers have considered how labor markets respond to shocks when they are exposed through an exogenous production-network, for example, through input-output linkages. However, these models ignore how the production networks themselves might shift and thereby change the level of exposure to these shocks. As Huneus [2] points out, production networks must change in response to economic shocks, affecting the rate at which these shocks propagate throughout the economy. In this paper I will demonstrate how changes in endogenous production networks lead to changes in the labor market that systematically vary across sectors.

In what follows I first present a model of endogenous production-network formation, similar to that of Lim [1]. However I also include labor-market frictions as in Helpman and Itskhoki [7]. The model not only demonstrates how endogenous production-network formation affects labor-market outcomes, but also shows how these labor-market frictions determine the production-network centrality of sectors in the economy. In the following section I present the predictions of the model and simulate the effects of the home country unilaterally imposing a tariff on a particular sector

in the foreign country. After discussing the baseline model, I compare it to other models featuring trade and labor-market frictions. In order to demonstrate the effect of labor-market frictions on endogenous production-network formation, I compare the model presented in Section 2 to an analogous extension of Lim [1] that includes an immobile labor supply. To demonstrate the effect of endogenous production-network formation on labor-market outcomes I compare my model to an extension of [7] that includes exogenous sectoral linkages in production, similar to that of Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro [12] and Jones [14].

## 2 A Double Sided Matching Model of Production

In this section I build a model of endogenous production-network formation with labor-market frictions in which firms must pay a fixed cost to match with each customer firm, and they must also pay a cost to post employment vacancies. The economy consists of multiple regions and sectors, each of which has a continuum of firms and a fixed labor supply. Sectors and regions vary by the

employ given the labor-market frictions. In order to hire workers, firms must post vacancies and must pay a cost per each vacancy posted. The firms cannot costlessly adjust their labor supply which induces workers and firms to engage in wage bargaining and generating wage differences within sectors and regions.

In what follows I present the model in detail by first considering the household's problem and then examining the firm's problem. I then present definitions of the equilibrium conditions of the model.

### 2.1.1 The Household's Problem

Within each sector-region pair  $(z)$  the representative household supplies units of labor to the economy by searching for employment. The household has love of variety preferences given by:

$$U_{q;z} = \int_{s;r} \int_{z} [x_{qz}^H(\cdot)]^{\frac{H_{s;r}}{H_{s;r}-1}} dF_{s;r}(\cdot) \quad (2.0)$$

where  $H_{s;r}$  governs the degree to which households value inputs from sector-region pair  $(s;r)$ .  $H_{s;r} > 1$  is the elasticity of substitutions between firm specific varieties in sector  $z$ . Total demand for each firm's brand by the representative consumer in sector region  $(z)$  is given by the following:

$$x_{q;z}^H(\cdot) = \frac{I_{q;z}}{P_{q;z}^H} \frac{P_{q;z}^H}{p_{q;z}^H(\cdot)} \quad (2.1)$$

where

$$P_{q;z}^H = \int_{s;r} \int_{z} \left( \frac{H_{s;r}}{H_{s;r}-1} \right) \left[ \tau_{s;r}^z p_{q;z}^H(\cdot) \right]^{H_{s;r}-1} dF_{s;r}(\cdot) \quad (2.2)$$

is the price index of the representative consumer in sector region  $(z)$ .  $I_{q;z}$  is the total income of the household in sector  $z$ . The parameter  $\tau_{s;r}^z$  is an iceberg trade cost term that determines how costly it is to ship sector-goods from region  $s$  to region  $z$ .  $p_{q;z}^H(\cdot)$  is the price charged to households in sector region  $(z)$  by firm  $q$ .

Each firm can sell to all regions and sectors in the economy. This implies the total demand that

rm faces from households in the economy is given by:

$$x^H(\cdot) = \sum_{q:z} x_{q:z}^H(\cdot) \quad (2.3)$$



The cost of hiring one more worker in sector  $s$  is denoted by  $w_{s,t}$  and  $P(x_s)$  is the cost the firm must pay to increase its CES aggregator of intermediates by one unit.

The firm combines intermediates across sectors using the following CES aggregator:

$$x_s = \left( \sum_{s^0} \alpha_{s,s^0} [x_{s^0}]^{\frac{s-1}{s}} \right)^{\frac{s}{s-1}}$$

determine the extensive margin of trade within the model. I assume that the fixed cost of firm-to-firm matching is paid in terms of labor within the model.

Given the matching function, the firm combines intermediate varieties within each sector according to the following CES-aggregator:

$$x_{s^0}(\cdot) = \int_{r^0}^Z m(\cdot; \theta) [x(\cdot; \theta)]^{\frac{s;s^0}{s;s^0} - 1} dF_r(\cdot; \theta; s^0) \quad (2.7)$$

where  $x(\cdot; \theta)$  is the total sector  $s^0$  variety demanded by the firm and  $\frac{s;s^0}{s;s^0}$  is the elasticity of substitution that governs how sectors substitute between sector varieties. Given this structure, the conditional demand for variety  $\theta$  by firm  $r^0$  is given by:

$$x(\cdot; \theta) = \left[ \frac{r^0; s^0 p(\cdot; \theta)}{P_{s^0}(\cdot)} \right]^{s;s^0} x_{s^0}(\cdot) P_{s^0}(\cdot)^{-s;s^0} \quad (2.8)$$

where the firm's unit cost of increasing its sector  $s^0$  CES aggregator  $P_{s^0}(\cdot)$ , is defined as:

$$P_{s^0}(\cdot) = \int_{r^0}^Z m(\cdot; \theta) \left[ \frac{r^0; s^0 p(\cdot; \theta)}{P_{s^0}(\cdot)} \right]^{1 - \frac{s;s^0}{s;s^0}} dF_r(\cdot; \theta; s^0) \quad (2.9)$$

where  $\frac{r^0; s^0}{s;s^0}$  is the cost of shipping sector  $s^0$  goods from region  $r^0$  to region  $r$  and  $p(\cdot; \theta)$  is the price charged by firm  $r^0$  when selling to firm  $r$ .

**Firm Pricing and Firm-to-Firm Matching** Given that the price elasticity of demand for a firm's variety only varies across sectors, within each sector pair, a firm does not find it optimal to price discriminate. Firms will find it optimal to price discriminate across sectors, but not within a given sector they are selling to. This implies the standard CES markup over unit cost for each firm:

$$p(\cdot; \theta) = \frac{s;s^0}{s;s^0 - 1} \left( \frac{r^0; s^0 p(\cdot; \theta)}{P_{s^0}(\cdot)} \right) \quad (2.10)$$

where  $\mu_{s;s^0} = (1 + \mu_{s;s^0}) > 1$ , is the markup over the unit cost of production that is charged by all firms when selling to sectors. Firm  $s^0$  similarly charges a markup over unit costs when selling to the representative household employee that is given by:

$$p_{q;z}^H(s) = \mu_{H;s}(s) \quad (2.11)$$

where  $\mu_{H;s}(s) = (1 + \mu_{H;s}(s))$ .

Given the firm's optimal pricing rule, we can now calculate the profit the firm would earn from selling to households in any given sector region.

$$\pi_{q;z}^H(s) = \frac{1}{1 + \mu_{H;s}(s)} \left[ \mu_{H;s}(s) \right]^{H;s} \left[ \frac{q}{s;r} \left( s \right) \right]^{H;s} \left[ \frac{H}{s;r} \right]^{H;s} \left[ P_{q;z}^H \right]^{H;s} \quad (2.12)$$

Agg TJ markup o

match with customer firms, the selling firm must pay  $f_{s,r}$  in matching costs. Given these assumptions, firm  $0$  will find it profitable to sell to firm with probability:

$$m(\theta; \theta) = F \frac{(\theta; \theta)}{b_{s,r} f_{s,r} \theta} \quad (2.15)$$

Following with Lim [1] I assume that takes on a Weibull distribution. Therefore the total labor employed by a firm to facilitate matching with all other firms can be calculated as:

$$FC(\theta) = f_{s,r} \int_{\theta}^{\infty} \theta^{\alpha} E$$

thought of as a communication cost between the customer and supplier. Real-world examples of this fixed cost include time spent communicating with or finding customers, customization of the



Where  $c_{s,r}$  is the cost of posting each employment vacancy.

Finally, the labor market must clear. That is the number of labor-market matches in a given sector region must equal total employment by firms in the same sector region:

$$H_{s,r} = \int L(\cdot) dF_{s,r}(\cdot; r) \quad (2.25)$$

## 2.3 Competitive Equilibrium

Solving the model requires the inclusion of two more sets of equations. First, the goods market must clear. Second the income of households in each sector region must be calculated.

There exists a goods market clearing condition for each variety. Firms sell their output to households and any other firm in any sector region that they agree to match with by paying their fixed cost of matching. Thus the total output of the firm must equal their total sales:

$$X(\cdot) = x^H(\cdot) + \int_{s^0}^Z m(\cdot^0, \cdot) x(\cdot^0, \cdot) dF_{s,r}(\cdot^0) \quad (2.26)$$

This equation (equation 2.1) and the unit cost equation (equation 2.5) classify every firm's problem as each firm specific variable in the problem can be written in terms of the two variables these equations define, given the other sector region specific variables.

The total income of households in each sector region is calculated by aggregating over the total payments to workers by firms. Since the workers receive a share of profits equal to  $(1-\alpha)$  this implies that total income in each sector region must be equal to a share of total sector region

This implies that the total income of workers in sector region is given by:

$$I_{s;r} = \frac{Z}{1 + \dots} \quad (2.28)$$

Having closed the model we can now define a competitive equilibrium of the model:

Definition 2.1. Given a set of parameters and a firm-level distribution of labor augmenting productivities, a competitive equilibrium consists of a set of variables that maps from the binary Cartesian power of the set of all firms,

$$f(x; \theta; p; \dots; m; \theta)_{g_{\theta; \theta}}$$

, a set of variables that maps from the Cartesian product of the set of all firms and the set of sector regions,  $f(x_{q;z}^H; p_{q;z}^H; \dots)_{g_{\theta; q;z}}$ , a set of variables that maps from the Cartesian product of the set of all firms and the set of all sectors,  $f(x_{s^0}^H; x_{s^0})_{g_{\theta; s^0}}$ , a set of variables that maps from the set of all firms,

$$f(x^H; X; \dots; x; \dots; P; H; FC; L; V; \dots)_{g_{\theta}}$$

and a set of variables that maps from the set of all sectors and regions,

$$f(L_{s;r}; H_{s;r}; V_{s;r}; I_{s;r}; b_{s;r}; P_{s;r}^H)_{g_{\theta s;r}}$$

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Parameter	Description	Assumed Value
	Household Bargaining Power	0.5
	Employment Share of Production	0.5
H	Household's Elasticity of Substitution Across Varieties	5.0
	Firm's Elasticity of Substitution Between Inputs and Workers	4.0
s	Firm's Elasticity of Substitution Across Sectors	6.0
ss	Firm's Elasticity of Substitution Across Varieties, within a sector	8.0
m	Firm–Worker Matching Function Scale Parameter	1.0
	Weight of Vacancies in Firm-Worker Matching Function	0.5
	Mean of Firm Labor Augmenting Productivities	0.0
	Variance of Firm Labor Augmenting Productivities	1.0
	Scale Parameter of Distribution of Stochastic Firm to Firm Match Cost	1.0
k	Shape Parameter of Distribution of Stochastic Firm to Firm Match Cost	0.25


Table 1: Parameters for Simulation

production-network formation in response to changes in trade costs. I then highlight the role that endogenous firm to firm matching plays in how aggregate outcomes change.

### 3.1 Baseline Model Simulation

I simulate the effect of a tariff in model assuming the parameter values given in table 1. I assume that the firm specific labor augmenting productivities, are distributed Log-Normal, the mean and variance of their distribution are presented in table 1. In addition to the parameters listed in table 1, I allow  $\sigma$  to vary across sectors and regions. This parameter will not only drive changes in the cost of hiring workers and thus employment in response to changes in trade costs, but it will also govern how firm specific production networks will change in response to the imposition of a tariff.

In what follows I assume that there are 2 countries (Home and Foreign), and that Home unilaterally imposes a tariff on imports from one specific sector in Foreign. This tariff applies to sales to households and firms in Home.



(a) Foreign sector to which the tariff is applied

(b) Non-import competing sectors in Home, within regions

Figure 3.1: Within sector-region average firm-level mass of customers

Figure 3.1 presents the average mass of customer firms, across all firms within a given sector-region pair as a share of the total mass of firms in the economy, from the model outlined in section §2. The numbers on the y-axis represented in figure 3.1 are small, however they represent the weighted average across the set of firms within each region. Due to the assumption of the Log Normal distribution of labor augmenting productivities, there are many small firms who are unable to match with any customer firms whatsoever. Figure 3.2 presents the results from figure presenting the mass of customers for only the largest firm in each region. Note that in free trade the most productive firm in the import competing sector with the lowest cost of posting employment vacancies sales to around 9 percent of all firms in the economy.




Figure 3.2: Import competing sector in Home across regions, values represent the most productive firm in each sector-region pair.


A few results pop out immediately from figure 3.1. First, sector-region pairs with a higher cost of posting employment vacancies feature a lower firm-level average mass of customer firms. This result is due to two mechanisms. The first is the fact that in sector-region pairs with a higher cost of posting employment vacancies the probability of a worker choosing to search in one of these sectors and matching with an employer is lower, due to the fact that firms will post less vacancies since it is more expensive. Since less workers search for employment in these high job-vacancy-posting-cost sectors, due to the low probability firms will in general hire less workers and thus be able to produce less. When firms produce less, they are less attractive as customers to other firms limiting their access to inputs and causing their unit cost to rise. When unit costs rise the firm will

and it less profitable to sell to other firms due to higher unit costs of production, making it much more likely that the firm doesn't sell to firms. The second mechanism is due to the assumption that workers must pay their fixed cost of matching in terms of labor, implying for each match with a customer-firm that the selling-firm undertakes they must hire an additional unit of labor, implying the firm must post employment vacancies. This limits the relative number of firm-to-firm-matches that firms in high vacancy-cost sector-regions can have.


The second result from figure 3.1 is that the shape of the response to an increase in the trade costs is highly non-linear. For Foreign firms, the tariff causes the mass of customer firms to decay quickly as trade costs move away from free trade. This is due to the decrease in potential profits from selling to firms in Home. Home firms first see an increase in their mass of customer firms as trade costs move away from free trade. This is because as the tariff increases, Home workers are more likely to search for employment in the import competing sector, lowering the firm's unit cost through lower employee-hiring costs, as shown in figure 3.1. This means that at first, firms in the import competing sector are able to match with more customer firms due to their lower unit costs. But as trade costs continue to rise the loss of Foreign suppliers takes over, leading to higher unit costs and a decrease in the mass of customers for firms in the import competing sector industry. Firms in non-import competing sectors follow a similar, but less pronounced, pattern. This is due to the fact that as workers search more in the import competing sector, the cost of hiring workers in the non-import competing sectors increases. However, these firms benefit from the import competing sector's initial growth through the production network. As the gains from the tariff in the import competing sector are eliminated, so too are the lesser gains in the non-import competing sector.

Finally firms in sector-regions with lower costs of posting employment vacancies are more sensitive to changes in the tariff. This is due to the fact that these firms are more integrated with foreign firms, due to their attractiveness as suppliers and customers to other firms. The contrast in responses to trade shocks between sector-regions with different costs of posting employment vacancies is the most pronounced within regions among "non-import competing" sectors, as in

Figure 3.1b. As trade costs increase, within all regions, each sector sells less due to their increased unit costs (from a lack of access to foreign suppliers). Since low  $\tau$  firms are more integrated into the international economy their relative total sales decrease and their relative unit costs increase in response to an increase in the tariff rate. These effects counteract one-another in the labor demand equation. Initially as the tariff increase takes the economy away from free trade the  $\tau$  firms demand more workers since unit costs increase by more than sales fall. This effect is more pronounced among high  $\tau$  firms due to their greater integration in the production network.




(a) Foreign sector to which the tariff is applied




$V_{sr} = 0.25 \dots 0.375$

(b) Import competing sector in Home, across regions



(c) Non-import competing sectors in Home, across regions



$V_{sr} = 0.375 \dots 0.5625$

(d) Non-import competing sectors in Home, within regions

Figure 3.3: Within sector-region average firm-level total employment

The effect of firm-to-firm matching on sector-region aggregate labor-market variables occurs through two channels, labor demand for production and labor demand for paying the fixed cost of matching between firms with the former dominating the latter. The amount of fixed cost paid in terms of labor by each firm in a sector region, resembles the firm's mass of customers presented in Figure 3.1 and is negligible in magnitude. The effect of firm-to-firm production on labor demand is

two-fold. First, since labor demand is increasing in total sales, the inclusion of endogenous production networks lowers the amount of labor demanded by each firm due to the fact that firms are not able to sell to all other firms. Secondly, the inclusion of endogenous production networks makes labor demand less responsive to the change in the tariff. This is because the inclusion of endogenous production network mutes the effect the tariff relative to a model where firms can freely trade without paying a matching cost.

## 4 Comparison to Different Models

In this section I compare the model to several other models of international trade to emphasize the crucial interaction between mobile labor supply and endogenous production-network formation. First in order to demonstrate how labor-market-mobility affects production networks, I present the results of a model with endogenous firm to firm matching that does not include labor-market mobility across sectors (analogous to Lim [1] and Huneeus [2]). Presenting these models next to my own highlights the importance of labor-market frictions in determining the production network. I then present two models with labor-market frictions that do not feature endogenous production networks. The first of the two has no connections across firms (analogous to that of Helpman and Itskhoki [7]). The second allows firms to be connected to all other firms in the economy through an exogenous production network such that there are linkages that are identical across sector pairs (as in Jones [14] or Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro [12]). Contrasting against these models stresses the role that endogenous production networks play in labor-supply shifts and other labor-market variables.

### 4.1 Comparison to Other Models of Endogenous Production-Network Formation

In the first comparison I emphasize the effect of the reallocation of labor supply across sectors on endogenous production networks by comparing the model to one in which each sector is endowed

with an immobile labor supply. The model is not identical to that presented by Lim [1] and Huneus [2], however it features the same labor-market setting as the model presented above without the conditions given in equation (2.21) and equation (2.22). The amount of labor supply available to each sector is simply given by  $L_{s,r} = L_{s,r}$ , where  $L_{s,r}$  is a simple constant that is equal across sectors and regions. This assumption shuts down the migration of labor across sectors, allowing the comparison of this first counterfactual model to the one presented in section §2 to be interpreted as the effect of labor migration on endogenous production networks.

## 4.2 Comparison to a Model with Exogenous Input-Output Linkages Across Sectors

In the second comparison I emphasize the importance of endogenous production-network formation in determining labor-market outcomes, by comparing the model to one that features an exogenous production-network as in Jones [14] or Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro [12]. Once again, the comparison model is not identical to either of the ones mentioned, however the spirit of the model is similar. All firms within a given sector pair are linked via the input-suitability parameter  $\alpha_{s,s}$ . More specifically this second counterfactual model assumes that  $\alpha_{s,s} = 1 - \delta; \delta$ , so that  $\delta$  governs the size of linkages across sectors. This assumption preserves all labor-market features laid out in section §2 and maintains the assumption that all firms are connected. The key difference between this counterfactual model and the baseline model is the assumption that the production-network does not change in response to the tariff as it does in the baseline model.

Figure 4.1 presents the total employment by firms across non-import competing sectors in Home. The baseline model is more responsive to the tariff than the counterfactual model of exogenous input-output linkages. This is due to the fact that in the input-output model the amount of inputs available to each drastically falls in response to the tariff, whereas in the endogenous production-network model even in free trade only some firms are exposed to the Foreign market






Figure 4.1: Labor Demand in Non-Import Competing Sectors in Home

and implementing the tariff only affects some firms. As the tariff continues to increase, the labor demand in IO model attenuates while labor demand in the endogenous matching model continues to increase. This is due to the changing relationships between other domestic firms. As the import competing sector benefits from the tariff, this spills over into the non-import competing sector through more connections being formed in the endogenous model. This effect is absent in the input-output model since the network between all firms at home are left unaffected.

## 5 Conclusion

This paper highlights the fact that models of endogenous production-network formation are inseparable from models of labor-market frictions that feature labor mobility across sectors by presenting a model of endogenous production-network formation and labor-market frictions. Comparing the model to one without labor-market frictions reveals the importance of inter-sectoral labor-market mobility in determining how endogenous production-networks change in response to tariffs. Looking at the model next to one with an exogenous shock



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