



Readings: Ch. 13

**Hw3:** 13.B.2, 13.B.4, 13.C.1, 13.C.5.

**Midterm Exam**      Thursday, October 10; regular class time.

**Topic 4      The Principal-Agent Problem**

Readings: Ch. 14

**Hw4:** 14.B.4, 14.C.3, 14.C.7, 14.C.8.

**Topic 5      Theory of the Firm**

Readings:

-405.

Williamson, O.E., *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism*, 1985, New York: Free Press.

-719.

-382.

Greenlee, Patrick, David Reitman, and David Sibley, "An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts," *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 2008.

Segal, Ilya and Michael Whinston, "Exclusive Contracts and the Protection of Investments," *RAND*, 2000.

Segal, Ilya and Michael Whinston, "Naked Exclusion: Comment," *AER*, 2000.

Spier, Kathryn and Michael Whinston, "On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance and Renegotiation," *RAND*, 1995.

Simpson, John and Abraham Wickelgren, "Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition," *AER*, 2007.

**Hw6:** (1) Using a simple model to explain the Chicago School argument that anticompetitive exclusive contracts are not profitable. Briefly explain the possible reasons under which this argument no longer hold. (2) Write a short review of Özlem Bedre-Defolie and Gary Biglaiser (2017).

## **Topic 7          Economics of Search**

1. Price Search in Homogeneous Product markets

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Armstrong, M, Vickers, J, and

